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Contextualism in Ethics 
Gunnar Björnsson 
In more than one way, context matters in ethics. Most clearly, the moral status of an 
action might depend on context: although it is typically wrong not to keep a promise, 
some contexts make it permissible. More radically, proponents of moral particularism 
(see PARTICULARISM) have argued that a reason for an action in one context is not 
guaranteed to be even a defeasible reason in every context; whether it counts against an 
act that it breaks a promise or inflicts pain might depend on the particulars of the 
situation. In moral epistemology, Timmons (1999: Ch. 5) argues that whether a moral 
judgment is epistemically responsible depends both on the basic moral outlook of the 
moral judge and on whether the context of judgment is one of engaged moral thinking, 
or one of distanced, skeptical reflection. In the former, the judge’s basic moral outlook 
can serve to justify the judgment; not so in the latter (see EPISTEMOLOGY, MORAL). 
Our focus here, however, will be on forms of metaethical and, more precisely, 
semantic contextualism in moral discourse and moral thinking. According to these 
forms of contextualism (henceforth “metaethical contextualism,” or just 
“contextualism”), the meaning or truth‐conditions of a moral judgment or moral 
assertion depend not only on the properties of the act it concerns, but also on features 
of the context in which the judgment or assertion is made, such as the standards 
endorsed by the moral judge or the parties of the conversation. If metaethical 
contextualism is correct, it might be that when two people both judge that abortions 
must be banned, one judge might be correct whereas the other is mistaken, because 
they accept different fundamental norms. This would undermine the idea that there are 
unique correct answers to moral questions. 
Metaethical contextualism is supported from three directions. First, what is 
expressed by terms such as “good” and “ought” seems to be context‐dependent when 
used outside ethics, varying with speakers’ interests and concerns. One might therefore 
expect similar context dependence when these terms are used to express moral 
judgments, assuming a corresponding variety of moral interests and concerns. Second, 
many have thought that deep moral disagreements show that the interests and concerns 
behind moral judgments do vary in this way. Finally, contextualism promises to make 
sense of what seems to be an intrinsic yet defeasible connection between moral 
judgments and moral motivation, by tying the meaning or truth-conditions of moral 
judgments closely to interests and concerns of moral judges. At the same time, 
contextualism faces two broad kinds of challenge: to make sense of the seemingly 
categorical or objective pretensions of moral claims, and to explain why the parties to 
deep moral disagreement often behave as if they were disagreeing about substantive 
issues rather than talking past each other. In the sections that follow, we look closer at 
both sources of support and problems for contextualism. 
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The Context Dependence of “Good” and “Ought” 
It is well known that the content of what we say is determined not only by the words we 
choose, but also by the context in which the words are used. Clearly, what claim is made 
by an utterance of “I am here now” depends on the time and place of the utterance, 
and on who is making it: “now,” “here,” and “I” pick out different times, places, and 
individuals in different contexts. Similarly, the judgments expressed when we say of 
someone that she is “tall” might variously measure her against the length of others her 
age, or others her age and sex, or against that of, say, professional basketball players. 
Interestingly, context‐sensitivity also seems to be a feature of expressions used to 
make moral or normative claims, such as “obligation,” “right,” “wrong,” “must,” 
“ought,” and “good.” We shall focus on “ought” and “good,” beginning with the latter. 
Consider a sentence such as: 
(1) “The weather is good.” 
If it is uttered by tourists considering a day at the beach, it seems to say that the weather 
answers to the requirements for a pleasant day at the beach; if uttered by farmers 
considering crop yields, it would instead be saying that the weather answers to the 
requirements for a high crop yield. Since these are different requirements, one utterance 
of the sentence might be true while the other is false, even if the utterances concern the 
weather at the same time and same place. 
In light of these and other examples, it seems clear that “good” means, roughly, 
“such as to satisfy requirement R,” where R varies across contexts (see Mackie 1977: 
55–6; for similar suggestions, see Finlay 2014: Ch. 2; Thomson 2008: Chs. 1–4). The 
relevant requirement, R, is often clear from the kind of thing called “good”: “a good 
conversation” typically means one satisfying typical requirements on conversations, and 
“a good knife” means one satisfying the requirements that we typically have when using 
knives, i.e., cutting and handling well. At other times, R is clear from our specific 
knowledge of the interests and concerns of the speaker: a scenographer talking about “a 
good knife” might have in mind one fitting a certain scene well, whether or not it cuts 
well. When the kinds of requirements in question are otherwise unclear, they are often 
made more explicit: “good for the crops,” “good for a day at the beach,” “good for you 
but not for me.” 
 “Ought” seems to display similar patterns of context dependence. In general, to say 
that something ought to be the case or that someone ought to do it seems to express 
that it is “favored” among some set of relevant alternatives. What varies from context 
to context are the considerations that select the relevant alternatives and favor one of 
them. For example, depending on context, an alternative might be favored because it 
is probable given the evidence, or makes the achievement of some end most probable, 
or conforms better to some ideal: 
(2) “Since she left almost an hour ago, she ought to be here soon.” 
(3) “[Given what we knew,] It ought to have dissolved; I wonder why it didn’t” 
(Mackie 1977: 73). 
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(4) “To look more casual, Jill ought to wear blue jeans.” 
(5) “To open the safe, Jill ought to use a Phillips screwdriver” (cf. Wedgwood 2007: 
117). 
As with “good,” context might make the italicized explications of the relevant 
considerations unnecessary: watching Jill struggling to open the safe, we can utter (5) 
without the explication, to the same effect. 
Notice that “ought” judgments that relate to goals or ideals need not express the 
speaker’s endorsement of the goal or ideal in question: (4) and (5) might be uttered as 
pieces of conditional advice, or as matter‐of‐fact information about dress codes or 
locksmithery. Similarly, “ought” judgments can be made relative to a restriction of 
alternatives that we do not endorse, as in: 
(6) “Since you are not going to stop shooting up heroin, you ought at least to use clean 
needles” (cf. Jackson 1985: 181–2; Wedgwood 2007: 119). 
Judgments can also be made both relative to evidence that we ourselves possess, and 
relative to evidence possessed by an agent who we think ought to do something. For 
example, looking down from above on someone making his way through a maze, we 
might be correct in saying both of the following: 
(7) “He has no way of knowing it, but he ought to turn left at this point.” 
(8) “Given what he knows, he ought to turn right at this point” (Wedgwood 2007: 
118; my italics). 
Again, although explicit indications of the relevant states of evidence often help, the 
right conversational context makes them redundant. (For different ways of 
understanding the context dependence of “ought” judgments, see Mackie 1977: Ch. 3; 
Wedgwood 2007: Ch. 5; Price 2008: Ch. 2; and Finlay 2014: Ch. 3. For criticism, see 
Thomson 2008: Chs. 10–11.) 
From Semantic Context Dependence to Metaethical Contextualism 
The discussion in the previous section left open numerous questions about the exact 
analyses of “ought” and “good,” and said nothing about how context determines the 
content of claims involving these terms. What seems clear, however, is that what 
utterances using those terms express does depend on context, and more precisely on 
interests, goals, and ideals that are relevant in that context. Our question now is whether 
this extends to uses of “good” and “ought” in ethical contexts, such that two people who 
are considering whether an action is morally good, or whether it ought to be performed, 
might be asking different questions. In other words, does the contextual variation 
support metaethical contextualism? 
We have already seen one possible example of this, illustrated by (7) and (8): 
apparently some “ought” judgments mean to identify the alternative that is morally or 
rationally ideal in relation to the knowledge or beliefs of the agent, whereas other 
judgments also take into account information that the agent lacks (Jackson 1985; Finlay 
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2014). If such information relativity is possible, perhaps differences between those who 
tie the moral status of actions to their actual consequences and those who tie it to their 
expected consequences stem from a focus on different moral questions. That there are 
different such questions is further suggested by thoughts about what one ought to do in 
cases of normative uncertainty: 
(9) “I know that the correct theory is either utilitarianism (in which case I ought 
to choose policy A) or prioritarianism (in which case I ought to choose policy 
B). But since I have no idea which of these two theories is right, I ought to 
choose policy C. For on either theory, policy C is a close second.” (Pittard 
and Worsnip 2017: 168). 
This line of reasoning seems to presuppose that the ought-claim of the conclusion is 
compatible with the ought-claims of utilitarianism and prioritanism. The apparent 
intelligibility of this reasoning, whether sound or not, thus suggests that we readily 
recognize different ought-questions. 
More contentious and radical than information relativity is the idea that the content 
of moral judgments varies with the ideals operative in the context of judgment. Here, 
proponents of metaethical relativism have argued that deep moral disagreement and 
differences in moral outlook between cultures, or between, say, liberals and 
conservatives or consequentialists and deontologists, make it implausible that the truth‐
conditions of their moral judgments coincide (see RELATIVISM, MORAL; DISAGREEMENT, 
MORAL). If sentences involving “good” and “ought” generally express different claims 
depending on the requirements, ends, and ideals that speakers take to be relevant to 
their judgments, this would seem to provide a natural fit for the moral relativist, 
accommodating both individual and cultural moral variation. 
However, some who have stressed context dependence have simultaneously rejected 
metaethical relativism. Even if one thinks that the terms used to express moral 
judgments are context‐dependent, one might also think that, in moral contexts, our 
judgments relate to the same fundamental requirements (see Mackie 1977; Wedgwood 
2007). In the following section, we consider some of the concerns that people have raised 
against metaethical contextualism. 
Categoricality, Motivation, and Disagreement 
One common objection to metaethical contextualism is that it fails to capture the 
practical relevance or normativity (see NORMATIVITY) of moral judgments. If moral 
“ought” judgments are always relative to some set of considerations, and if there are 
numerous such sets that favor different alternatives, morality seems neither to offer 
practical guidance nor demand any particular action (see, e.g., Montminy 2007). What 
the contextualist can say, however, is that when we are asking ourselves what we ought 
to do, then, insofar as our question has a determinate content, we are already relating 
that question to one particular set of considerations. Moreover, insofar as these are 
considerations that we ourselves endorse acting from, the judgment we arrive at will be 
practically relevant for us. 
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Even so, one might think that metaethical contextualism fails to capture the sense in 
which we intend our judgments to relate to the correct set of moral considerations, not 
just the set that we happen to endorse. But it is unclear how this would be a problem 
for contextualism. Insofar as one’s sense that considerations should be correct has 
reasonably determinate content, the contextualist can understand it as constituting an 
abstract or higher‐order way of specifying the considerations that one endorses. As long 
as standards of correctness vary across contexts, the upshot would still be a form of 
metaethical contextualism. Moreover, deep moral disagreement does seem to involve 
variation not only in what parties count as relevant moral considerations, but also in 
standards of correctness. 
A related but importantly different objection focuses on the connection between 
moral judgments and moral motivation. According to metaethical contextualism, our 
motivation to act on a particular “ought” judgment depends on something external to 
the judgment itself, in particular on whether we are motivated by the set of 
considerations invoked by the judgment. This might seem highly plausible for some 
explicitly relativized or conditional “ought” claims (such as the claim that, in order to 
look more casual, I ought to wear blue jeans). But in normal cases that lack explicit 
relativization, thinking that one ought to do something and being at least somewhat 
motivated to do it do not seem to be two separate states: the motivation seems internal 
to the judgment. Similarly, to think that an action is “good” often seems to already 
involve being in favor of its performance. Many have taken this to suggest that moral 
judgments are either beliefs with contents that are somehow intrinsically motivating or 
desires or preferences of some sort rather than beliefs (see INTERNALISM, 
MOTIVATIONAL; COGNITIVISM; NON-COGNITIVISM). 
Though contextualism might seem incompatible with an intimate connection 
between “ought” judgments and motivation, some have instead argued that 
contextualism is particularly well placed to account for this connection. While denying 
that the content and nature of “ought” and “good” judgments guarantee motivation, 
Dreier (1990) and (in more detail) Finlay (2014: Ch. 5) suggest that, in identifying the 
content of a given “ought” sentence, we normally assume that the set of considerations 
that it relates to is one that motivates the speaker. (Similarly for the requirements that a 
“good” sentence relates to.) The reason for this is that, in contexts where it is not 
otherwise clear to what considerations an occurrence of “ought” relates, the audience 
can reasonably assume that the considerations are ones that matter to the speaker: 
otherwise, why make the claim? (This assumption is especially reasonable in contexts 
where the speaker is engaged in practical deliberation.) Making an “ought” claim in 
such contexts thus creates a presupposition that the speaker cares about the relevant 
considerations, whatever they are. Since this presupposition precedes any assignment 
of a specific content to the “ought” claim, it will naturally seem that the motivation is 
inseparable from the judgment expressed. 
If this pragmatic account is correct, it seems to capture the practical relevance of 
moral judgments without postulating intrinsically motivating contents or taking on the 
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difficulties of a non‐cognitivist analysis of moral judgments. Moreover, it leaves room 
for cases suggesting that motivation is external to “ought” judgments: cynics, amoralists, 
or apathetic people who realize that they ought not to do what they are doing, but who 
are unmoved by this thought (see AMORALIST). Contextualism allows that such 
characters make judgments in relation to the requirements and considerations that they 
were once moved by, or that other people in their community are moved by. 
Contextualist analyses of “ought” might also provide a natural fit for the idea that 
what an agent ought morally to do must be an action that the agent could be (rationally) 
motivated to do (see RATIONALISM IN ETHICS). In many contexts where we make 
judgments about what someone ought to do, our judgments seem to have a rational 
practical point, being intended to identify an action that the agent could (in principle) 
be rationally convinced to do, or has internal reasons to do (see REASONS, INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL; cf. Finlay 2006). If the truth‐conditions of “ought” judgments depend 
on our concerns in making them, as examples of the context dependence of “ought” 
suggest, the truth of judgments with this particular point could well depend on whether 
the action in question is favored by an ideal or end that the agent could be rationally 
compelled by. Furthermore, if agents’ varying subjective desires determine what ideals 
or ends agents can be rationally compelled by, they would determine what agents ought 
to do, in the sense expressed by these judgments. The upshot would be a version of 
normative relativism, though one restricted to practical “ought” judgments with a 
rational practical point. 
Perhaps the most common and serious objection to metaethical contextualism is that 
it misrepresents agreement and disagreement (see Lyons 1976 for a classical statement; 
cf. Dreier 2009). For example, it seems natural to say not only that those on the other 
side of seemingly intractable moral controversies about abortion, animal rights, 
ownership rights, etc. ultimately relate to different moral considerations, but also that we 
disagree with their judgments and, often, that they are wrong or mistaken. In saying this, 
we seem to do two things. First, we attribute moral judgments to those on the other side, 
understanding that these judgments are based on their fundamental moral outlook. 
Second, we assess the correctness of their judgments based on our moral outlook. This 
two‐part practice seems hard to reconcile with the contextualist assumption that the 
truth‐conditions of moral judgments depend on the considerations that moral judges 
relate to when making their judgments. Given this assumption, our assessments seem 
blatantly insensitive to the truth‐conditions of the judgments assessed. Also, this 
insensitivity would contrast starkly with how we assess judgments involving some other 
context‐dependent expressions. If Alexander says of 7‐year‐old Beth that “she is tall,” 
clearly comparing her with other children her age, we would not naturally say that 
Alexander is wrong merely because Beth struck us as short compared to adults. If he is 
wrong, it seems, it would be because he got his comparison wrong, not ours. 
Metaethical contextualists seem to have two broad kinds of options in trying to 
explain these phenomena. 
The first sort of explanation would be that, in attributing disagreement and making 
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insensitive assessments, we make a mistake. Perhaps we make a semantic mistake, failing 
to understand that the truth‐conditions of moral judgments depend on the 
considerations that are relevant in the context of judgment. Given that such semantic 
blindness seems constrained to some specific context‐dependent domains (including 
moral discourse, but excluding attributions of tallness), this explanation would seem 
plausible only if something about these domains would make this mistake particularly 
likely (cf. Francén Olinder 2013). Or perhaps, in spite of the deep differences between 
parties of intractable moral disagreements, we make a pragmatic mistake, failing to take 
into consideration the possibility that the parties ultimately relate to different 
considerations in making their judgments. The pragmatic suggestion gets some support 
from empirical data indicating that insensitive assessments of correctness or 
incorrectness become less common as the difference between moral outlooks becomes 
increasingly radical and thus harder to ignore (Sarkissian et al. 2011). If this is right, 
contextualists need not worry about seemingly insensitive assessments. But data also 
suggests that we continue to attribute disagreements between parties with radically 
different moral outlooks even while ceasing to insensitively assess correctness and 
incorrectness (Khoo and Knobe 2016). Apparently, then, contextualists would still need 
a nonstandard account of disagreement attributions. 
Another sort of explanation sees attributions of disagreement and insensitive 
assessments as perfectly adequate given the practical function of moral judgments. Moral 
questions are largely shaped by concerns about how to behave, what attitudes to have, 
and what behavior and attitudes to publicly support, and we normally expect people’s 
moral judgments to correspond to attitudes guiding their behavior and emotional 
reactions. Because of this, we have a practical interest in keeping track of when people 
make moral judgments with conflicting attitudinal or behavioral consequences, as such 
judgments constitute a kind of practical disagreement. We also have an interest in 
assessing the correctness of moral judgments of others relative to the considerations that 
we endorse as publicly upheld guides of conduct. Even given contextualism, this could 
explain not only attributions of disagreement and why we make insensitive assessments, 
but also why such assessments are limited when moral outlooks seem to rule out any 
common guides of conduct. Moreover, it would account for the difference between 
moral talk and thought and other context‐dependent domains – tallness judgments do 
not normally have the same intimate connection to attitudes and action. (For 
developments of this suggestion, see Finlay 2014 and Björnsson 2015.) 
Whether any of these explanations succeeds is currently an open question, as is the 
question of whether parties of moral disagreements do have fundamentally different 
concerns (see DISAGREEMENT, MORAL). 
See also: AMORALIST; COGNITIVISM; DISAGREEMENT, MORAL; EPISTEMOLOGY, 
MORAL; INTERNALISM, MOTIVATIONAL; NON‐COGNITIVISM; NORMATIVITY; 
PARTICULARISM; RATIONALISM IN ETHICS; REASONS, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL; 
RELATIVISM, MORAL 
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